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ABSTRACT 
The viability of enactivist philosophy in providing descriptions of biological 
phenomena (bioenactivism) across the phylogenetic spectrum relies in large part 
on the scalability of its central concepts, i.e. whether they remain operative at 
varying levels of biological complexity. In this paper, I will examine the 
possibility of scaling two deeply intertwined concepts: cognition and 
surrounding world (Umwelt). Contra some indications from Varela and others, 
I will argue that the concept of embodied cognition can be scaled down below 
the level of the organism. I will draw upon the “cognitive biology” espoused by 
Kováč (2000, 2006) and Monod’s (1971) studies of protein behaviour to make 
this case. The downscaling of embodied cognition below the level of the 
organism has ramifications for how we understand the concept of surrounding 
world (Umwelt). Reconfiguring the relation between these two central 
bioenactive concepts has further consequences for what ontological 
commitments bioenactive thinking leads to, and what paths of investigation it 
points us toward.  
1. Introduction 
The viability of enactivist philosophy in providing descriptions of biological 
phenomena (bioenactivism) across the phylogenetic spectrum relies in large 
part on the scalability of its central concepts, i.e. whether they remain operative 
at varying levels of biological complexity and scale. Maturana and Varela’s 
insistence on the continuity between minimal (single-celled organisms) and 
 
† BrisSynBio (a BBSRC/EPSRC Synthetic Biology Research Centre) and Maastricht University, 
Netherlands. 
74  Humana.Mente – Issue 31 – December 2016 
  
human cognition (Maturana and Varela 1980); the “Strong Mind Life 
Continuity Thesis” that we find in Thompson (2007) and elsewhere (Thompson 
and Stapleton 2009); Di Paolo’s attempt at a non “species-specific” and non 
“biochauvanist” account of cognition (Di Paolo 2009); and De Jesus’s 
formulation of a biosemiotic variant of bioenactivism (De Jesus 2016) are all 
instances of this attempt to scale the concept of cognition across the 
phylogenetic spectrum and in some cases beyond the boundaries of the living to 
artificial systems.  
In this paper, I will examine the possibility of scaling two intertwined 
concepts: cognition and surrounding world (Umwelt). 1  Drawing upon the 
“Cognitive Biology” developed by Kováč (2000, 2006) and Monod’s (1971) 
studies of protein behaviour, and contra some indications from Varela and 
others, I argue that the concept of embodied cognition can be scaled down below 
the level of the single-celled organism and that downscaling embodied cognition 
below the level of the organism has ramifications for how we understand the 
concept of Umwelt. Reconfiguring the relation between these – cognition and 
Umwelt – and other central bioenactive concepts like autopoiesis and autonomy 
has further consequences for what ontological commitments bioenactive 
thinking leads to.  
My argument thus agrees with Bitbol and Luisi's findings (2004) that 
cognition is a condition of the living, but disagrees that autopoietic systems are 
a pre-condition for cognition. I do not wish to argue that a system can be 
classified as living but not autopoietic, rather that cognition can be scaled below 
that level of autopoiesis; and subsequently the same holds for the concept of 
Umwelt.  
Here, I agree with Ripps (2005) that: “the presence of such a boundary per 
se,” a condition for autopoiesis, “should not be essential to the individual 
processes that maintain the system.” Subsequently, cognitive processes can 
occur at sub-autopoietic levels. Such processes ground or are foundational for 
the boundaries, and consequently the identity of autonomous cognitive systems. 
My argument also runs counter to the idea that autonomy (and not autopoiesis) 
is the “crucial bridge to cognition” (Thompson and Stapleton 2009, p. 24). I 
do not doubt that there are “autonomous” systems that are not autopoietic, but 
rather that autonomy is a condition for cognition. Subsequently, I also question 
 
1  The term Umwelt is sometimes rendered into English as “environment” (e.g. Thompson and 
Stapleton 2009). I opt for “surrounding world”.  A surrounding world is always a horizon of cognition 
and action, i.e. a place of “salience, meaning and value” (Thompson and Stapleton 2009, p. 25). 
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that the most basic form of living, cognitive system is the single-celled organism 
(Thompson and Stapleton 2009, p. 25).      
In the following sections, I first briefly examine the idea of scaling in 
reference to concepts like cognition and Umwelt. Second, I examine some of the 
central foci of bioenactivist thinking, with particular attention to the original 
concept of autopoiesis, Di Paolo’s (2009) emphasis on its virtual dimension and 
De Jesus’s “biosemiotic enactivism” (2016). The combination of biosemiotics 
and the virtuality of cognition are important contributions to enactivist thinking 
and points toward significant consequences for how we think the relation 
between cognition and Umwelt at an ontological level. Third, I turn to Kováč’s 
“cognitive biology” and Monod’s analyses of protein bonding to argue for the 
further downscaling of embodied cognition and Umwelt below the level of the 
single-celled organism. Finally, I will sketch what I think the consequences of 
this further downscaling are for the project of developing enactivist ontology.  
My contention is that it brings us toward an ontology of nested and 
overlapping Umwelten that are not necessarily proper to the level of the whole 
organism, autopoietic, or autonomous system. This calls for an account of the 
individuation and regulation of Umwelten that also maintains a place for the 
concept of the virtual.  
2. Scaling Concepts 
2.1 Scaling up and down 
Scalability, in this context, entails that concepts are operative across different 
levels of systemic complexity in a fashion that is functionally and structurally 
akin, i.e. that roughly the same kind of thing is happening in roughly the same 
kind of way. This is a particular challenge for bioenactivism because many of its 
operative concepts seem to be drawn, at least initially, from   philosophy of mind 
and human phenomenology and then scaled down to less complex systems. In 
this sense, enactivism opens itself up to charges of anthropocentrism. The 
affinity of much bioenactive thought to Hans Jonas’s phenomenology of life 
further reinforces the legitimacy of these charges (see Wolfe 2015 and De Jesus 
2016 on this point). 
The concept of autopoiesis, as developed by Varela and Maturana – a 
concept which forms the basis and inspiration for bioenactivism as a sub field – 
is however not subject to downscaling, but is scaled up. Autopoiesis (self-
constructing, or self-making) was developed as a descriptive concept from the 
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observation of minimal forms of life and then scaled up across the phylogenetic 
scale to account for greater levels of complexity. The concept of autopoiesis as a 
descriptive condition of minimal life is also used outside of the enactivist 
literature alongside related scaled down concepts like embodied cognition, 
embodied knowledge, surrounding world and communication (see, e.g. Mann 
2012, Kováč 2006). Use of these concepts in discussions of minimal conditions 
of cellularity (Mann 2012, 2013) supports the hypothesis that they are scalable 
so long as the usage implies a structural and functional similarity.  
 
2.2 Scaling worlds 
An important distinction, introduced by Jakob von Uexküll, between Umwelt 
(surrounding world) and Welt (world) (von Uexküll 1926, 2010) illustrates 
how the concept of Umwelt is also scalable. An Umwelt “is a milieu of behaviour 
proper to certain organisms” […] “the ensemble of excitations which have the 
value, and signification of signals.” (This is George Canguilhem’s definition of 
von Uexküll’s terminology (Canguilhem 2008, p.111).) The Umwelten of 
living-organisms can be contrasted to the Welt qua “universe of science.” Welt 
is a derivation and formalization of our Umwelt: our understanding of capacities 
at vastly varying scales remains derived from the species-specific human Umwelt 
that constrains our analyses, including our capacity to scale concepts. In this 
way, von Uexküll insists that his theoretical biology remains “Kantian” insofar 
as it remains within the constraints of human cognition, or the human Umwelt.  
But there is no reason to simply presume that we project the structure of 
these interactions, and the concurrent appearance of teleonomy or teleology and 
normativity, onto other systems or Umwelten.2 It is also possible that we observe 
cognition, norms, values, and similar structures of behaviour in other systems 
because their surrounding worlds share a similar structure to our own; this is 
indeed what von Uexküll seemed to think. This was also his reason for insisting 
on an ethological method of observing animals in their natural habitats as 
experimental conditions distorted their species-specific Umwelten, imposing 
the conditions and constraints of our own onto the experimental conditions.  
 
2 By teleonomic I mean genuinely goal-directed processes or behaviours whose goal directedness is 
the outcome of an evolutionary process (see Mayr 1974). Nb, teleonomic does not imply here an "as 
if" structure wherein the goal directedness is extrinsic to the process and ascribed by an external 
observer. Thanks to Paolo de Jesus for suggesting this clarification. 
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Up to this point, I have spoken of bioenactive scaling on a spectrum from 
single-celled organism to human beings. However, I want to bring into question 
the fundamental level or scale at which we can speak of embodied cognition, 
embodied knowledge, and Umwelt. Specifically, I want to call into question the 
privileging of the whole-organism or whole-system as the fundamental level of 
Umwelt analysis. The analytical privilege afforded to the whole organism or 
system level is, I think, a common feature across versions of bioenactivist 
philosophy. Di Paolo (2009) to an extent addresses this whole-organism bias in 
his attempt to arrive at a “non-species specific, non-bio-chauvinist definition of 
cognition.” He nonetheless seems to propose holding onto the intuition that 
cognition implies a self-constituted systemic identity to which cognitive norms 
refer (15).  
Reasons not to adopt the whole organism or whole system as the fundamental 
level of cognition can be found in Kováč’s biochemistry inspired “cognitive 
biology.” Kováč proposes the biomolecular as the fundamental level of 
cognition and draws upon Monod’s (1971) account of the allosteric regulation 
of protein-ligand bonding to make this argument. Monod’s account of 
embodied cognition at the biomolecular level and his deployment of this 
phenomenon against holistic or organism-centric level of analysis raises 
significant issues for some of the core bioenactivist arguments.  
3. Bioenactivism 
3.1 Borders and Umwelten 
Bioenactivist approaches to cognition are varied but share an emphasis on 
cognition as a reciprocal enactment of both a cognizer and a surrounding world, 
and not as a representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind. This has 
invited accusations of “idealism” (Pascal and O’Regan 2008) insofar as the 
surrounding world in question is proper to the level of the corresponding co-
emergent system, e.g. organism or population. The more serious versions of this 
criticism focus on the fact, already noted, that autopoietic enactivism gives 
undue privilege to the single autonomous living system; and subsequently 
conceives cognition and world-formation in a fashion that is overly dyadic and 
confined to the membrane boundary (Wheeler 2010); despite the claims to a 
“relational” account of cognition (De Jesus 2016; Wheeler 2011). The charge 
of idealism is vague as idealism is an oft caricatured and contested term. 
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Nonetheless a reappraisal and revision of the notion of autopoiesis in its relation 
to cognition, enactivism, and autonomy should help to clarify to what extent this 
may be a legitimate critique. Ultimately, I think that the Umwelt centred 
approach that I develop here is not susceptible to the charge.  
The term enactivism itself stems from the work of Maturana and Varela 
(1998) and also Varela’s later work (1989; 2000; see also Luisi 2003). As Luisi 
points out, the term “co-emergence” might have been preferable. This is 
because enactivism understands the activity of cognizing and hence engaging 
with the world as a “dynamic embodied interaction” (De Jesus 2016) between a 
cognizing system and its surrounding world (Umwelt); the boundaries between 
which may be fuzzy and characterised by interchange, though ultimately 
discernible. What is central is that the self-organisation of the organism’s 
internal-milieu and the reciprocal interaction with the surrounding world are co-
constitutive of both the organism and the Umwelt.  
This in no way rules out that the Umwelt which co-emerges with the 
organism/system contains meaning structures that pre-exist the 
organism/system. A surrounding world is both emergent on various levels with 
its proper system, and inherits pre-existing meaning-structures that are 
actualised precisely in the border-creating activity that occurs between material 
embodied knowledge(s) and the emerging surrounding world. In other words, 
the material components of a systems can bear embodied knowledge about an 
Umwelt that does not yet exist on the basis of inherited and evolved knowledge 
from other Umwelten; i.e. surrounding worlds proper to other systems – 
depending on the various forms of transmission of inherited information, e.g. 
vertical or horizontal gene transmission.  
The process of ordering or individuation that enacts the internal milieu of 
the organism – its self-organisation – and concurrently also enacts an Umwelt 
for that organism/system is also what we can call an ecological development: the 
organism/system and its Umwelt now form a component or dimension of an 
over-arching ecology of interdependent and interacting Umwelten. These are 
ecologies of meaningful surrounding worlds, the latter emerging at varying 
levels of individuation (e.g. protein, cell, organism, population, species). We 
can think of something along the lines of enactive niche-construction, where a 
cognizing system does not just alter the material conditions of its and other 
systems’ physical environment, but also the sense-structures into which other 
borders are formed or emerge (in a sense parallel to Darwin’s insight that the 
most important aspect of an organism’s evolutionary niche were other 
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organisms). The dynamics of the overarching Umwelten-ecology can still only 
be analysed from within the perspective of an individual Umwelt. The co-
constitution, individuation, or enactment of cognizing systems and 
corresponding Umwelten, and the impact of these individuations upon an over-
arching Umwelten-ecology is central if we wish to eventually speak of enactive 
ontology in the manner that I propose.This account is not necessarily out of step 
with Maturana and Varela’s understanding of a “cognitive domain” as being a 
“region of the environment that has co-evolved” (Bitbol and Luisi 2003, p. 101) 
with the organisationally closed system to which it corresponds, and in which the 
system persists and develops through various perturbations.   
This  brief account, focussing on the relation between cognition and Umwelt 
generation, already incorporates a critique against Varela and Maturana’s early 
autopoeitic theory, i.e. that it was overly functionalist and structural at the 
expense of sense-making (Di Paolo 2005). The use of the term Umwelt 
indicates that the surrounding worlds in question are meaningful worlds of cues, 
affordances, and tintings that function as sign-relationships in the 
system/organism’s modulation of its own comportment. 3  It is nonetheless 
helpful to further review the basic dimensions of the initial concept of 
autopoiesis before moving to discuss its semiotic and virtual aspects.  
An autopoietic system entails the establishment of a membrane which creates 
a border between the external and newly established internal milieu. The 
membrane is maintained by the dynamics of the internal milieu. Maintaining the 
border consequently establishes an identity for the cell or other form of 
autopoietic system. Both the membrane and the internal milieu must however 
be maintained and re-produced using materials and energy from the external 
milieu: metabolites. The role of the external milieu in providing the material and 
energetic means for maintaining the internal one, and the reciprocal function of 
the internal milieu in supporting the maintenance of the membrane, makes an 
autopoietic system organisationally closed but materially-thermodynamically 
open, which entails that the border/membrane is porous (allowing the system to 
resist entropy). Operational closure also implies that the internal milieu is 
 
3 This point is nicely illustrated with the example of bacteria swimming up a sugar gradient. The sugar 
molecules have a significance to these organisms; but the significance is not intrinsic to the sugar 
molecule, rather it belongs to the Umwelt that is generated by the relation between system and 
surroundings and which has a history outlasting the system itself, which the system inherits. This 
example is used in multiple places in the literature, see, e.g. Thompson and Stapleton (2009, p. 24-
25). 
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maintained by a network of processes that are all intertwined (at least at the 
minimal level). An autopoietic system can thus be described as an emergent 
property of said network. The argument that I want to make as we proceed is that 
cognition is occurring at the level of these processes below the level of the 
autopoietic systems as a whole. Another way to phrase this would be to ask if the 
self-production and maintenance of the system and its membrane are necessary 
for cognition and Umwelt enaction? I think not. This contention runs counter 
to autopoietic theory that focuses on the importance of the membrane; but I also 
want to argue that cognition and Umwelt do not require autonomy as a pre-
condition, which runs counter to bioenactive theory which shifts the emphasis 
from autopoiesis to autonomy and insists on the self-generation of systemic 
identity. First, it is necessary to explain in greater depth what cognition means 
in this context.   
 
3.2 Cognition as Breaking with Chemical Necessity 
 
Very coarsely, at the minimal cellular level, metabolic relations between the 
autopoietic system and its environment are deemed “cognitive” insofar as they 
are not chemically necessary but rather involve recognition and reaction as a 
result of a selective process (Di Paolo and De Jesus add the virtual and semiotic 
dimensions onto this coarse model). The system recognises aspects of its 
environment as having value or not for the perdurance of the system or for other 
forms of normative behaviour, e.g. fulfilling teleonomic function. These 
relations can be characterised biochemically, but this is distinct from being 
chemically necessary. The chemically necessary dynamics of the environment do 
not fully determine the dynamics of the internal milieu or the behaviour of the 
system (Luisi 2003). In autopoietic theory, the non-necessity of relations is 
attributed to the function of the membrane which insulates the system from its 
chemical environment. Living is thus the process of maintaining this boundary 
and the internal milieu that both relies upon and creates and maintains, 
materially and formally, the boundary.    
The break from chemical necessity also gives the autopoietic system 
temporal or even historical dimensions. Cognitive interactions both within the 
cell and with the Umwelt proceed according to patterns that have been 
evolutionary selected for. These patterns also allow the system to anticipate 
changes or interactions in and with the environment (these anticipations can be 
faulty leading to the breakdown of the system or maladaptive behaviour). In this 
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way autopoietic and other autonomous systems acquire evolutionarily selected 
“habits” of interaction which help ensure the maintenance of certain patterns 
that sustain some degree of independence from environmental circumstances. 
These habits can be considered a form of embodied knowledge and can be 
transmitted across generations (e.g. vertical gene transfer) or throughout 
populations (e.g. horizontal gene transfer) through the mechanisms of 
materially embodied knowledge. It is in this sense that operative meaning-
structures or significative relations can pre-exist any one particular Umwelt to 
which they belong.  
The cognitive capacity of any system relies on its evolved embodied habits or 
knowledge; but these habits have a teleonomic or teleological orientation 
toward the system’s own persistence and can thus be said to operate along a 
value gradient that is particular to the system’s Umwelt. Merleau-Ponty 
summarises perfectly this dynamic: “it is the organism itself […] which chooses 
the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive. The environment 
[read: Umwelt] emerges from the world through the actualisation or the being 
of the organism” (Merleau-Ponty 1967; also cited in Luisi 2003).           
Several critical points can be made here. As Luisi points out, Maturana and 
Varela are not consistent on whether life should be equated with cognition, or 
whether the conditions of autopoiesis are a pre-condition for cognition (Luisi 
2003, p. 54). These being:  the system has a semipermeable boundary; the 
boundary is produced by the system; and the system encompasses reactions that 
regenerate the components of the system. Maturana and Varela also argue at 
points for equivalence between the three terms: cognition-autopoiesis-life. It is 
problematic either way as it is arguable that the second two conditions rely on 
molecular cognition which occurs at a lower level than the system itself — this is 
debatable within some experimental proto-cell systems that are deemed 
autopoeitic without being cognitive (Bitbol and Luisi 2004) or living. This is 
linked to a related problem that seems to run throughout the bioenactivist 
literature, including Di Paolo’s anti-biochauvanism, namely that cognition 
occurs at the boundary of whole (organism-like) systems; and a critique more 
specific to Varela that single-celled organisms are the lowest level of cognition 
(Luisi 2003, p. 54, citing Varela and Maturana 1998, Maturana and Varela 
1980). Most bioenactivists now seem to agree that adaptive autonomy and not 
autopoiesis is the condition for cognition, while nonetheless maintaining that 
biologically based non-autopoietic autonomous systems rely on basic 
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autopoietic cellular constituents. Cognition in the living remains subsequently 
founded on the cellular level of autopoiesis.  
Another objection is that the all or nothing nature of autopoeisis – a system 
is either autopoietic or not, and if not, non-living – fails to capture the gradations 
of norms that characterise life (Di Paolo 2005); these would include health and 
illness, vigour and fatigue and so on (Di Paolo 2009, p. 14).  
Adaptive autonomy (e.g. Di Paolo 2005, 2009, Thompson and Stapleton 
2009; Froese and Di Paolo 2011), as an alternative to the all or nothing nature 
of autopoiesis, can be defined as a system’s capacity to regulate its states in 
relation to its external milieu in a fashion that is teleonomically or teleologically 
oriented according to the various value gradients present in its Umwelt. And, in 
doing so, generate its own identity. That is, cognitive systems engage in 
anticipatory behaviour. There is no problem in saying that the cognitive work-
space of adaptivity is evolutionarily determined in the fashion that I described 
above in relation to inherited meaning structures.  
Di Paolo’s adaptive autonomy based critique of autopoiesis is particularly 
relevant to the direction of my argument here insofar as he insists on a virtual 
dimension to cognitive capacity, which he equates with sense-making properly 
speaking. Di Paolo (2009) argues against the equivalence of living and cognitive 
systems, while making the claim that a living system is one that is capable of 
cognitive engagements. This simply makes the scope of the cognitive potentially 
broader than the scope of the living, while keeping it within the constraints of 
adaptive autonomy. Moreover, cognition properly speaking for Di Paolo 
involves future-oriented regulation of behaviour. It is the future-orientedness 
that implicates a virtual dimension. The virtuality comes from the selective 
behaviour between “otherwise equally viable paths of encounter with the 
environment” (Di Paolo 2009, p. 14). Once this virtual dimension is integrated 
into the definition of cognition, Di Paolo argues, in reference to Weber and 
Varela (2002) and Thompson (2007), we can begin to speak of behaviour and 
sense-making. A system that makes sense must be able to: “recognize in those 
states [of its surrounding world], and only in them, the virtual tendencies that 
relate it as a whole to the potential loss of its own viability and, in addition, it 
must be able to act appropriately on those tendencies” (Di Paolo 2009, p. 15). 
Incorporation of the virtual dimensions of the Umwelt into behaviour is 
precisely “adaptivity” and subsequently “agency.” We can speak of agency here 
because there is a teleonomic and hence normative orientation of behaviour. 
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3.3 Biosemiotic Enactivism 
De Jesus (2015; 2016) seeks a further revision of autopoietic enactivism by 
introducing a de-Kanted Uexküllian phenomenology (2016, p. 142). Two 
things should be noted here. First, De Jesus introduces von Uexküllian 
phenomenology as an alternative to the affinity between enactivism and Hans 
Jonas’s work, which does not properly insulate itself from the charge of 
anthropocentrism. De Jesus seems to agree with Wolfe (2015) that Jonas 
analyses human subjective experience and then downscales in an effort that is 
more concerned with situating his phenomenology of human subjectivity within 
a post-Cartesian and Darwinian perspective than in being concerned properly 
for the nature of biological life per se (see De Jesus 2016, p. 134). Second, De 
Jesus attempts to de-Kant what he refers to von Uexküll’s “overly subjectivist” 
construal of the Umwelt. This means rejecting the idea that the “Umwelt is an 
inner subjective appearance of exclusively subjective phenomena” in favour of a 
relational approach wherein the Umwelt is a “relational domain constituted 
through interactive sign processes, which are irreducibly triadic” (De Jesus 
2016, p. 142).  De Jesus also seeks to emphasize the commonality of animal 
worlds over and against von Uexküll’s perceived focus on the disparity of 
Umwelten. In fact, von Uexküll seems to go both ways, arguing for the specificity 
of individual Umwelten and using species specific Umwelten as a kind of 
shorthand or scientific generalisation (see Tønnessen’s introduction in Brentari 
2015). 
On this second point, it is important to make two comments. It is not 
possible to fully de-Kant von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory without losing precisely 
the essence of the concept of Umwelt, its specificity. This is why von Uexküll 
continuously insisted that human scientific activity was carried out from within 
a human Umwelt, which is its widest scope is the world of science, and called his 
approach a kind of Kantian biology. To try to objectify the Umwelt is to turn it 
into the World qua world of science, and miss precisely the specificity of what 
the concept does. This is why we need to think Umwelt theory in terms of levels 
of nested and intertwined Umwelten. Such a theory allows us to maintain the 
idea of Umwelten proper to individual organisms or systems, and even to 
processes within systems, while at the same time acknowledging species and 
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population level Umwelten and the intertwining at higher levels; different 
species-level Umwelten may share sign-relations.  
When we characterize Umwelten, including our own, we are doing a kind of 
modelling. Like all modelling, Umwelt modelling can proceed in finer and 
coarser grained fashion. The Umwelt of an individual organism is modelled in a 
finer-grained fashion than that of a species-level analysis, where certain 
generalities emerge in favour of idiosyncrasies. 
 What De Jesus also, rightly, objects to is a perceived internalism of von 
Uexküll’s position. We thus move from Umwelten being constituted by “inner 
subjective appearances” to exterior semiotic relations not requiring a recourse 
to some variant of mental or affective representations.       
Moreover, in drawing upon von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory De Jesus aims to 
show that we needn’t start from organisms functioning as “subjective agents” in 
their own right driven by a fundamental experienced desire to continue 
existence, but rather living systems negotiating their unique (or species-
specific) Umwelten through the mediation of signs; wherein a difference in the 
perceptual environment is recognized as indicating and eliciting something 
else, i.e. normative if not chemically necessary action. The central point of von 
Uexküll’s and hence De Jesus’s analysis of organismic worlds is that perceivable 
differences in the surrounding world matter for the organism. A difference in 
the environment is perceived and transformed into a sign through what von 
Uexküll calls function cycles, which are specifically not, or more than, 
sensorimotor loops. A sign is understood here simply as something that stands 
for something else. Perceptual stimuli are differently interpreted by organisms 
depending on context.  
Species, population, and individual specific function cycles are the result of 
an organism’s evolutionary history, its morphological development, the 
challenges that it encounters in the environment, and its continuously changing 
relations to its environment. This is why we need a multi-layered and coarse vs. 
fine-grained approach to Umwelt analysis. 
De Jesus’s take home point is that a “system can be said to be cognitive if it 
uses signs.” He argues that his biosemiotic proposal, which starts from an 
Uexküllian analysis of animal behaviour “offers a reversal of the [Jonasian] 
phenomenological argument” used to ground other versions of bioenactivism. 
De Jesus’s account of human cognition is a scaling up of minimal biosemiotic 
relations to the level of human symbolic communication: humans use signs in a 
more complex manner, namely by the use of symbolic signs (language) where 
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the relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary and conventional. De 
Jesus maintains that bio-semiosis is intrinsically normative insofar as, for most 
living systems, a failure in the capacity to read the signs which present 
themselves in the Umwelt usually leads to the mal-adaption of the living system 
to the environment.  
The semiotic approach to the Umwelt also allows for the retention of the 
virtual dimension of cognition emphasised by Di Paolo. The scope or expanse 
of the virtual dimension of cognition is down to sign usage. The more complex 
and open (arbitrary) semiotic relations are, the broader the virtual dimension. 
Simple cognitive systems like the proteins we will discuss in the next section, 
inherit the virtual envelop of their behaviour and do not further develop it. 
Humans possess the semiotic capacity to arbitrarily assign semiotic relations 
between sign and signifier—human language. De Jesus cites Hoffmeyer in 
referring to “semiotic freedom” as “capacity for responding to a variety of signs 
through the formation of (locally) meaningful interpretants” (Hoffmeyer 2012, 
p, 122, cited in De Jesus 2016, p.140). What I referred to as the virtual envelop 
of cognition can be understood in a similar manner. The more semiotically 
flexible the cognitive relations, the greater room for exploring potential avenues 
of action. In other words, flexible sign relations expand the virtual envelop of 
cognition.   
In this section, I have tried to establish three premises. First bioenactivist 
theories that start from the concepts of autopoiesis (critically or not) and 
cognition also imply the concept of Umwelt qua meaningful surrounding world. 
Second, the concept of Umwelt, if it is to be used productively, must, like the 
concept of cognition, be scalable. We need to talk about Umwelten at different 
levels that are nested and intertwined in various ways. We can think about 
Umwelt analysis not only on different levels, but also in terms of coarse and fine 
grained, depending on the level. Third, we can deepen the concept of cognition 
by recognizing the developments made by Di Paolo and De Jesus; namely that 
cognition requires a virtual dimension and semiotic relations; and that the virtual 
envelop of cognition is expanded alongside greater flexibility of semiotic 
relations. In the next section I ask if these premises apply when we attempt to 
scale further down to the biomolecular level. My contention, on the basis of 
Kováč’s “cognitive biology” and Monod’s analyses of proteins is that they do. 
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4. Cognitive Biology and the Regulation of Proteins 
4.1 Goodwin and Cognitive Process 
The term “cognitive biology” was coined by Goodwin (1978) to refer to his 
approach to biological process and organisation. What is at stake in Goodwin’s 
proposal is whether the rules explaining biological pattern formation are 
grounded in “natural law” or embodied knowledge derived from an evolutionary 
process. He opts for the latter. The argument is straightforward: these rules 
entail knowledge that is embedded in the evolved material structure of biological 
systems; systems which make use of knowledge are cognitive systems. Biological 
systems are thus cognitive in their formation and development. In this model, all 
biological systems have some knowledge about the world (coded and stored in 
DNA and other structures) and utilise that knowledge in order to survive and 
reproduce. Knowledge is defined here as “a useful description about some 
aspect of the world” (Goodwin 1976). Meaning emerges upon gene-expression 
and the “testing of hypotheses” about the environment in the interaction 
between the system and its environment. Meaning, in other words, emerges in 
the motile relations between the biological system and its environment (this 
point is agreed upon by enactivists). Goodwin uses this account to make a 
threefold distinction between information, knowledge, and meaning. 
Knowledge differs not only from meaning in the manner specified, but also from 
information insofar as knowledge also includes “instructions for action,” which 
in the relevant contexts are generative of meaning. This relation between 
knowledge and meaning allows for populations of cognitive systems to stabilise 
their behaviour and persist in potentially hostile circumstances through the 
adaptation of their behavioural responses. Advantageous responses are retained 
through natural selection, and adaptation of behaviour in line with a pre-defined 
goal gives the systems in question both a creative and teleonomic orientation and 
seemingly also indicates the virtual dimension, if we understand virtuality in this 
sense to mean “forming hypotheses” about future states of the Umwelt on the 
basis of embodied semiotic knowledge (meaningful sign relations) and also 
whatever degree of semiotic freedom or flexibility a system has. These 
hypotheses are then tested along adaptive, normative gradients.4 The virtual 
 
4 The ontological upshot for Goodwin is that the cognitive process described is precisely that, process 
and nothing but. It cannot be reduced to a level of explanation that somehow abstracts from the process.  
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capacity of a system, is also materially embedded, inherited, and selected for or 
against depending on its efficacy in facilitating normative behaviour. 
4.2 Kováč: How Low Can Cognition Go? 
Following from Goodwin (and Monod), Kováč poses a version of the question 
that framed this paper: “at what level would the concept of cognition —with its 
inventory of consciousness, cogitation, feeling, perception, sensing and living— 
lose meaning and correspond only to lifeless interactions?” (Kováč 2000, 
2006). By lifeless, he means interactions that are nomic or chemically necessary 
in character rather than cognitive.  
Kováč’s variant of cognitive biology proposes the biomolecular level as the 
fundamental level of cognition and suggests a descriptive science of cognitive 
interactions containing nested levels from the molecular sensor upwards. Like 
Goodwin, he maintains that cognition is embodied in evolved material 
structures and these structures are chemical. Cognition is therefore the 
property of non-nomic chemical systems. An important characteristic of such 
systems is that they are not scalar (not to be confused with scalable as I’ve been 
using the term), i.e. they cannot be characterised in purely magnitudinal terms, 
but are by definition vectorial; they have a specified direction or orientation of 
development. The vectorial dimension of cognitive chemical systems is 
attributed to the composition and structure of proteins (Kováč 2006, p. 564). 
Proteins are evolutionarily selected to perform “goal-directed teleonomic 
functions” (Monod 1971); their corresponding capacity to take on diverse 
conformations over time in response to their sensing of the Umwelt combined 
with their teleonomic character is what gives them their vectoriality.5  
Kováč describes the shape shifting of certain proteins as exploratory 
behaviour, insofar as it is a kind of testing the environment for appropriate 
ligands to bond with (ligands are substances that form complex biomolecules by 
binding with proteins in order to serve a teleonomic function). Because proteins 
alter their material conformation as a response to sign relations in the Umwelt, 
and because the alteration is not chemically necessary but evolutionarily 
selected, Kováč argues that they possess sentience: “the capacity to exhibit a 
variety of potential internal states, which respond to the immediate state of the 
 
5 I am not unjustly superimposing the term Umwelt onto Kováč. He writes: Because of its intrinsic 
teleonomy, a protein gives meaning and significance to its environment—that is, to its ligand” (Kováč 
2006, p. 564). 
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environment” (Kováč 2006, p. 564). By interacting in this fashion with its 
environment, the protein’s embodied evolutionary history and knowledge give 
significance to its surroundings transforming it into an Umwelt, wherein some 
recognized or perceived differences make a difference to the behaviour of the 
protein, hence functioning as signs, while others don’t. What makes a difference 
and what does not is modulated by an evolutionary history and is embedded in 
the material and spatial composition (how it is folded) that makes up the protein 
and modulates its dynamics. This process, by which a protein changes shape in 
accordance with its embodied knowledge and in order to bond with a ligand that 
it senses in its environment fulfils for Kováč the conditions of cognition. 
Cognition thus consists of recognition of meaningful differences in the 
environment turned Umwelt by the process of recognition itself and the 
historically mediated behavioural response to those differences.  
4.3 Allosteric Enzymes and The Principle of Gratuity 
Kováč’s analysis is based in part on Monod’s descriptions of the behaviour of 
allosteric enzymes (1971, pp. 65-78). While the cognitive function of 
“ordinary” enzymes is limited to the recognition of a specific substrate at the 
exclusion of all else, allosteric enzymes also selectively recognize and bind with 
several other substrates. This activity regulates the behaviour of the protein by 
inhibiting or increasing the rate of the protein’s metabolic activity in relation to 
the substrate. Most allosteric regulation is under the control of several effectors 
that work cooperatively or antagonistically (facilitating or inhibiting) to regulate 
metabolic processes.  
What is central to Monod’s analysis is that the effector substrate molecules 
that regulate the allosteric enzyme play no role in the subsequent metabolic 
activity. They serve only a regulatory role. The regulatory interactions are made 
possible by shifts in the shape of the protein which allow for the recognition of 
different ligands; the capacity of the allosteric enzyme to recognize a diversity of 
ligands on the basis of their shapes depends on its modulation of its own shape. 
Monod emphasizes that (1) the regulatory activity and the (strictly speaking) 
metabolic activity are not chemically connected, there is no interaction between 
regulatory ligands and ligands to be metabolised; (2) the protein’s responses to 
variation in the concentration of regulatory ligands are non-linear; and (3) there 
is no chemical dependence between the teleonomic function of the protein and 
the regulatory signals controlling it (the principle of gratuity). Allosteric 
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reactions thus proceed from the protein’s discriminatory or cognitive powers 
alone. The gratuity of these regulatory processes makes them semiotic: there is 
independence between the function and the signals controlling it. The protein 
reads signs in its Umwelt, but it also goes looking for them. These cognitive 
powers depend on the protein’s capacity to assume various states, wherein 
recognition of different regulatory ligands occurs. Kováč calls this modulation 
of shape “exploratory behaviour” (Kováč 2006, p. 564).     
We can draw from this several important points. Allosteric proteins clearly 
engage in cognitive behaviour that is teleonomic or teleological and hence 
normative. This cognition occurs independently at a systems-level below that of 
the cell, autopoietic system, or adaptive autonomous system (the protein does 
not generate its own identity as it is dependent upon transcription and 
translation processes for its identity). Yet, the allosteric protein has or is an 
instance of evolved “embodied knowledge” insofar as its scope for modulating 
its own shape has been evolutionarily selected for, but is also not chemically 
necessary. This makes the protein’s behaviour temporal or historical. The scope 
for shape-change that Kováč calls exploratory behaviour can also be considered 
a virtual dimension of the protein’s behaviour (the scope is real without needing 
to be actualised): the allosteric protein has a virtual design and cognitive work 
space. The virtual envelop of allosteric protein cognition is evolutionarily 
individuated by a process of selection for increased systemic coherence and 
efficacy. But, due to the gratuitous nature of the regulatory reaction it is also 
fundamentally open: everything is (or was once) possible (Monod 1971, p. 78). 
The fundamental openness relates to the regulation of the virtual envelop of 
cognition which is historically and not chemically necessarily constrained.        
This structure of embodied cognition that Kováč and Monod identify on the 
molecular level seems to apply at all levels of cognition. Even at higher levels of 
biological complexity, cognition for the most part entails the exploration of 
“pre-programmed” alternatives, a pre-determined virtual space. There is a  
cognitive work space that expands or gains extra dimensions with the use of 
more complex forms of signification or semiotics: “in general all living entities 
are semantically closed […] only humans, thanks to artefaction and the evolution 
of culture may be an exception, but much less so than one might assume” (Kováč 
2006, p. 565). Cognition, as carried out by allosteric proteins, seems a scalable 
concept, up to the level of complex human behaviour.  
Cognition within a meaningful Umwelt  entails processes by which meaning 
is individuated into specific Umwelten that present specific cognitive 
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possibilities to their inhabitants at all levels, including proteins. Subsequently, 
“life as information” or “life as computation” metaphors are misplaced. Life as 
cognition is a continuous process of limiting information flow by way of 
selection and rendering in terms of embodied knowledge and meaningful 
Umwelt relations; it is the individuation of Umwelten. For this reason Kováč 
writes that the “triggering of pre-determined responses and indeed selecting 
among them, seems to me a more appropriate description than information 
processing” (Kováč 2006, p.565).  
This account of cognition remains reductive in the sense that all cognition 
and behaviour at the organismic or biosystems level can be explained as 
“emergences” from the base cognitive level of biochemical or biomolecular 
cognition which is open to Umwelt analysis. And indeed, Monod uses the 
behaviour of allosteric proteins as an argument that autonomy at higher levels, 
i.e. the enactivist level of autonomous adaptive systems are dependent upon the 
cognitive activity occurring at the protein level. 
5. Toward an Enactivist Ontology of Regulation 
5.1 Consequences of Downscaling Cognition for Enactivism 
The downscaling of cognitive biosemiotic relations below the level of the cell or 
autonomous system has consequences for the enactivist approach to biology. It 
brings into question a number of the central tenants of enactivist thought, while 
also reinforcing the value of the enactivist approach. The bioenactivist approach 
has typically assumed that it “reaches from the single cell organism” to higher 
levels of complexity (Thompson 2007, Froese and Di Paolo 2011, p.2). Di 
Paolo’s anti- biochauvanism eschews the reference to cells, but holds onto the 
idea of adaptive autonomous systems as the agents of cognition. But the 
downscaling of cognition shows that autonomy is not a criteria for the “non-
mysterious emergence of non-reducible domains of activity” (Froese and Di 
Paolo 2011, p.3), at least not cognitive activity which includes the virtual 
dimension. The protein does not generate its own identity, but it nonetheless 
displays genuinely goal-directed, normative, semiotic, and cognitive (including 
the virtual envelop) behaviour in the fashion demanded by enactivist theory. 
Adaptive autonomy can no longer be considered the minimal form or level of 
sense-making (Froese and Di Paolo 2011, p.5). Neither the cell nor the 
autonomous system is the lower limit of the co-emergence of embodied 
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knowledge, meaning, cognition and Umwelt. Allosteric proteins qualify as 
having a “perspective of significance” which is “not intrinsic to the perturbation 
themselves,” or in somewhat clearer terms, not “chemically necessary.” The 
horizon of significance proper to the protein Umwelt has a history that extends 
beyond the particular protein. 
5.2 Umwelt ontology: individuation and regulation 
With the downscaling of cognition and Umwelt we arrive at a picture of 
intertwined and nested Umwelten. The Umwelt of the protein forms a dimension 
of the Umwelt of the cell, of which it is a material and meaningful constituent. 
These Umwelten are themselves components of and subject to regulative 
systems and dynamics of enormous scale and scalability: individuation and 
regulation of the sense-dimensions of a protein Umwelt, are but one regulatory 
aspect of a larger scale cellular process and so on. They are also processes of 
individuation of embodied knowledge. The processes by which embodied 
knowledge and Umwelten are individuated can only be separated by abstraction 
as they are aspects of the same individuation. Individuations within a particular 
Umwelt, that of an allosteric protein for example, insofar as they alter the 
behaviour of the cognitive system in relation to its surroundings, also function 
as individuations within the broader ecology of Umwelten at various levels.  
What ontological commitments or avenues of investigation does this lead us 
toward? An enactive ontology must be one that has individuation and regulation 
of meaning-relations across all scales, not autonomy, as its central foci. We 
might turn to the enactivist avant la lettre Merleau-Ponty for some guidance. 
Merleau-Ponty’s last attempts at developing an ontology are indeed intimately 
linked to this idea. He also tried to approach this new ontology (at least in part) 
via von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt. The intersection of the concept of Umwelt, 
and the concepts of individuation and regulation is what I think Merleau-Ponty 
is aiming to explore when he refers (one of only two times) in a working note to 
Gilbert Simondon. He writes: “The notion of regulation should be broadened 
[…] The concept of regulation should not be treated “objectively”, as indicating 
a process in the third person, as in the habit of science – Nor believe that 
regulation is each time the {operation} of the same Nature” (Merleau-Ponty 
1959, p. 42). 
The idea expressed within this passage is that regulation should be treated as 
an ontological concept (what Merleau-Ponty always had in mind when he used 
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terms like broaden or generalise); but also that it should remain within the 
constraints of an Umwelt analysis. That is, regulation should be studied as 
perceived in terms of meaningful relations as well as from a scientific, third 
person, cybernetic perspective, which we must be mindful to remember appears 
only within our Umwelt. He aims here at a phenomenological ontology of 
regulation. The study of animal Umwelten and of human perception as 
belonging to the nature that it perceives (a position that Merleau-Ponty adopted 
later in his life in contrast to his analyses of perception from the 1940s), were 
understood as ways into this endeavour.  
This also points to a point of conflict with Simondon:  
 
Simondon’s point of view is trans-perceptive […] Nevertheless, one no longer 
knows what one is talking about if one places oneself in the meta-perceptual […] 
For my part, […] the nexus [foyer] remains the perceptive field, insofar as it 
contains everything: nature and history. Simply, instead of saying: to be 
perceived and perception, I should rather say: brute or wild being and 
“foundation” (Stiftung). (Merleau-Ponty 1959, p. 42) 
    
This is the issue that I first raised in relation the idea of enactivism as Umwelt 
analysis. We remain constrained by individuations and regulatory processes 
proper to our own Umwelt or perceptive field. This brings us back to the 
problem of the virtual. The individuation and regulation of Umwelt relations 
within an Umwelt ecology are a question of the regulation and constraining of 
the virtual conceived as some kind of raw potentiality (“transindividuality in 
Simondon’s terms). This is, I think, another way of rendering what Monod 
meant when he said that everything is possible (Monod 1971, p. 78) but what 
has actually developed now constrains that envelop of initial virtuality, such that 
we speak of necessary relations that are not chemically necessary. They are 
necessary due to a history of individuation and regulation.  
Merleau-Ponty, cognizant of his own Umwelt situatedness maintains that any 
access to this virtuality, what he calls brute or wild being, must be through 
perception. Foundation or “Stiftung” is the term Merleau-Ponty takes up (from 
Husserl) to indicate processes of individuation and regulation of the virtual in 
relation to the actual. This relation between virtuality and regulatory constraint, 
parsed through meaningful Umwelt relations must, in my view sit at the heart of 
an enactive ontology. 
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The insistence on an approach that remains within the realm of perceptive 
being should not be misunderstood. The studies of art, biology, and politics that 
Merleau-Ponty engaged in as part of this ontological project are precisely 
attempts to perceptually access the relation between virtuality and 
individuation-regulation. Had he lived another two years, he likely would have 
seen Monod’s, Changeaux’s and Jacob’s studies (to which Monod refers in 
Chance and Necessity, e.g. Monod, Changeaux, Jacob 1963) as contributions 
to this new ontology. In his 1959 course on “Philosophy and Non-Philosophy” 
he told his students: “We are in contact with this type of [wild] being through 
our science and our private and public lives. But it does not have official 
existence: our ‘philosophical’ thought remains spiritualist, materialist, 
rationalist or irrationalist, idealist or realist […]” (Merleau-Ponty 1996, p. 37). 
Enactivism, in its relation to neurology, biochemistry and other fields, perhaps 
technology, can be a continuation of this ontological project.     
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